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Resumo – O risco país como medido pelo Embi+ do JP Morgan ou pelas notas das
agências de rating nem sempre parecem refletir os fundamentos da economia.
Freqüentemente países que seguem políticas econômicas sólidas são classificados no
mesmo nível de países com orientações populistas ou com uma história recente de default
ou de reestruturação de dívida, o que gera um sentimento desconfortável com respeito a
estas avaliações. O objetivo deste trabalho é investigar se estes indicadores refletem os
fundamentos de mercado ou se é possível identificar algum tipo de preconceito ou
intolerância com relação a certos países. A decompsoição de Oaxaca-Blinder é utilizada
para analisar as diferenças no risco país, como medida pelo Embi+ para um grupo de
países emergentes. A decomposição permite separar diferenças “justificáveis” isto é, as
que são baseadas em diferenças de fundamentos das “não justificáveis”, que são as
resultantes dos fundamentos serem avaliados de forma diferente. De 19 países na
amostra, 9 exibiram risco mais altos  do que os preditos por seus fundamentos: Argentina,
Venezuela, Ucrânia, Peru, México, Coréia, Colômbia e Rússia.
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 Abstract: Country risk as measured by JP Morgan’s Embi or by the grades of rating
agencies such as S&P’s or Moody’s does not always seem to reflect the fundamentals of
the economy. Frequently countries that pursue sound economic policies are placed on  the
same level as countries with a populist orientation or with a recent history of default or
debt restructuring, which generates a feeling of unease with regard to these evaluations.
The objective of this paper is to investigate whether these indicators reflect market
fundamentals or whether it is possible to identify some kind of prejudice or intolerance
towards certain countries. We use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to analyze the
differences in country risk, as measured by the Embi+ for a group of emerging markets.
This decomposition allows us to separate “justified”  differences, due to differences in
fundamentals, from “unjustified” ones, due to the same fundamental being evaluated
differently. Out of  the 19 countries in the sample, 9 exhibit higher spreads than are
predicted by their fundamentals: Argentina, Venezuela, Ukraine, Peru, Mexico, Korea,
Brazil, Colombia and Russia.
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Abstract
Country risk as measured by JP Morgan’s Embi or by the grades of rating agencies such
as S&P’s or Moody’s does not always seem to reflect the fundamentals of the economy.
Frequently countries that pursue sound economic policies are placed on  the same level as
countries with a populist orientation or with a recent history of default or debt
restructuring, which generates a feeling of unease with regard to these evaluations. The
objective of this paper is to investigate whether these indicators reflect market
fundamentals or whether it is possible to identify some kind of prejudice or intolerance
towards certain countries. We use the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to analyze the
differences in country risk, as measured by the Embi+ for a group of emerging markets.
This decomposition allows us to separate “justified” differences, due to differences in
fundamentals, from “unjustified” ones, due to the same fundamental being evaluated
differently. Out of  the 19 countries in the sample, 9 exhibit higher spreads than are
predicted by their fundamentals: Argentina, Venezuela, Ukraine, Peru, Mexico, Korea,
Brazil, Colombia and Russia.
1.  Introduction
Country risk has become an increasingly important factor in macroeconomics in
recent years with the integration of international capital markets. In many aspects the
degree of freedom of monetary and fiscal policy is constrained by country risk since the
economy’s external balance depends on this variable.  From a theoretical point of view
the determination of country risk is still in its early stages but there is some consensus
that the economy’s economic fundamentals determine its risk. Nevertheless, there have
been too many cases where countries with fragile fundamentals or with a history of recent
defaults have been evaluated as being less risky than countries that exhibit more solid
conditions. The questions this paper aims to answer are as follows: Is country risk
determined by fundamentals or by sentiment? Are the criteria used to determine country
risk the same for all countries or are some countries treated with a certain kind of
intolerance? Which countries are the most discriminated against in terms of the
determination of their country risk?
The determinants of emerging markets bonds spreads have been analyzed by a
number of authors over the course of the last twenty years. One of the first such works
was by Edwards (1986) who analyzed the bond markets for 13 developing countries
during 1976-1980, a period when most LDC debt consisted of bank loans. He found
evidence that the debt to GDP ratio had a positive effect on bond spreads. More recent
studies have the benefit of much larger bond markets for these countries.
Liquidity and solvency indicators play a role in bond spreads. For instance, Min
(1999) found that the ratios of external debt, international reserves and debt service to
GDP along with export and import growth rates were significant for a group of Latin
America and Asia countries during the 1991-1995 period. Other macro variables such as
the inflation rate, terms of trade, real exchange rate and net foreign asset accumulation
also helped to explain these spreads in his sample. On much the same lines is the work
produced by  Fiess (2003) who separates contagion from country specific fundamentals
for the joint determination of capital flows and country risk for four Latin American
countries in the 1990s. He found that capital flows were driven by both country risk and
global factors while country risk was solely determined by a number of fundamental
variables: the ratio to GDP of primary balance and public debt. Back (2001) estimating a
panel data found that during the period immediately following the Asian crises the
spreads were “almost entirely explained by expectations of market fundamentals”. In
developed countries international interest rates also played a role but stock market
volatility did not.
Eichengreen and Mody’s (1998) analysis attempted to separate the impact of
changes in fundamentals from that of changes in market sentiment regarding LDC’ bond
spreads. They controlled for the selective bias of new issuers and found that changes in
fundamentals explained the change in spreads but that, the same explanatory variableshad a different impact in different periods: market sentiment played a stronger role during
the Mexican crises (increasing spreads) and in the subsequent period (declining spreads)
than during the previous period. Also, the responses of spread to fundamentals in Latin
American countries were different from those observed in other countries that were
included in the sample.
On the same lines, Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) analyzed why it is
more difficult for some countries to repay their debts at levels that would be considered
moderate for other countries. They build a measure of debt intolerance based on an
estimated risk regression, using the ratings of the Institutional Investor Ratings as a
function of fundamentals and the default history of the countries.
The present paper is more in line with Eichengreen and Mody (1998), and
Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003). We estimate a risk regression based on the
fundamentals and default history of the countries and use the coefficient of this regression
to compute how much of the difference in spreads can be attributed to the difference in
country risk and how much to sentiment, intolerance or discrimination. In addition to this
introduction, section 2 presents some stylized facts regarding the economies being
analyzed, section 3 presents the estimates while the last section, presents the final
considerations.
2. Stylized Facts
JP Morgan’s Embi + measures the difference in bond spreads vis-à-vis US
Treasury Bills of the same maturity, for countries that are ranked as Baa1/BBB+ or below
by Moody’s and S&P rating agencies and some liquidity ranking rules. As Figure 1
below shows, for the period from Dec 1998 to Dec 2004 there is a huge difference in the
spreads exhibited by the countries in the sample
1: ranging from 3241 base points for
Argentina to 111 for Malaysia.
Figure 1









When we look at the relationship between the Embi+ indicator and a number of
macro variables we observe that for the most part correlations are in the predicted
directions. In order to measure the liquidity/solvency conditions of the countries we use
the ratio between exports and public debt. As can be seen in Figure 2 both, the average
embi together with its variance declines with this indicator.
                                                
1 The Embi+ has been computed since 1993 and many countries have already been excluded from the
sample for not meeting the standards. The above countries, plus Qatar and Nigeria, are the ones in the
sample today.                            Figure 2                                                     Figure 3
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In order to capture the fiscal fundamentals we calculate the ratio of public debt to
GDP. Figure 3 shows that the higher this ratio is the higher the Embi result. But, once
again we observe that this variance also increases with the debt ratio.
For other variables that capture domestic fundamentals we see in Figure 4 that
there is a slight positive correlation between interest rates and the country risk, with a
declining variance and, in Figure 5, a negative correlation between this variable and the
GDP growth rate.
                            Figure 4                                                       Figure 5
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The default history can be measured by the number of times that each country has
defaulted. In general in our sample, we find that those countries which have never
defaulted, namely Korea and Malaysia, had an average embi 5 times lower than those
countries which have already repudiated or restructured their debts. There is also, as we
can see from Figure 6, a positive relationship between the number of defaults and the
average Embi although in the extreme cases of Venezuela and Ecuador, which have each
registered seven defaults, the average embi is lower than that exhibited by Argentina,
which has registered six defaults.  But, as is pointed out by Reinhart, Rogoff and
Savastano (2003) a better measure for the correlation of country risk would be the length
of time since the last default or restructuring. Figure 7 shows the Embi figures as in
December 2004 and the number of months since the last default. Argentina, Ecuador,
Russia and Ukraine are the most recent countries to have defaulted.
                          Figure 6                                                         Figure 7
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0 1 0 2 03 0 4 05 06 0 7 08 0 Years since last DefautFollowing the same authors we also calculated debt intolerance as measured by
the inverse of the lapse (length) of time since the last default
2 multiplied by the ratio of
public debt to GDP.  The correlation of this index with the embi is highly positive as can
be seen in figure 8. With respect to the bond market we note in Figure 9 that there is a
slight positive correlation between the average spreads and average duration for the
countries in the sample and that the variance increases with duration.
                             Figure 8                                                           Figure 9
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All these facts confirm the expectation that country risk is highly determined by
fundamentals. Nevertheless some countries are systematically over the trend line, while
others are frequently above it. Brazil’s Embi, for instance, is frequently over it, indicating
that its country risk is higher than that predicted by fundamentals. On the other hand,
Egypt has a lower country risk than that predicted by its fundamentals since it is
frequently below the trend lines.
3. Estimation and Results
With the aim of measure the impact of fundamentals on country risk we estimated
a panel of 19 countries using monthly data for the period Dec 1998 to Dec 2004.  As a
second step we estimate the same model for each country and then, using an Oaxaca-
Blinder methodology, we decompose the differences in country risk into two
components: the part explained by fundamentals and the part explained by
discrimination. This methodology was used to capture the effects of this kind of
sentiment on different spreads over different periods in Eichengreen and Mody’s study
(1998). We adopt the same strategy, but use it specifically to compare country risks
between economies. The decomposition is carried out via a comparison of each country
with the pool of countries in the sample. This benchmark is specially opportune to our
purpose, once we can capture the differences in criterion comparing similar economies in
terms of fragility of their institutions and political regimes.
Country risk, as measured by the EMBI+ index, was estimated as a function of i)
the fiscal fundamentals captured by the ratio of public debt to GDP (PD/GDP); ii) the
general fundamentals of the economy: the GDP growth over the last 12 months
(GROWTH), inflation in the last 12 months (INF) and the annual nominal interest rates
(IR) as well as the ratio of international reserves to GDP (RES/GDP); iii) the liquidity
and solvency conditions as captured by the ratio between exports and public debt
(X/GDP); iv) the debt intolerance to defaulters which is obtained by multiplying public
debt to GDP by the index of the inverse of time since the last default
3 (DI). We also
controlled for the debt profile including the average duration of the bonds (MAT). The
reference currency is the US dollar and inflation rates were represented by the consumer
price index (CPI). All variables were obtained from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS) and Government Financial Statistics (GFS) of the International Monetary Fund or
from the Moody´s data base.
4
                                                
2 We use the inverse of time since the last default to not exclude from the analysis those countries that
never defaulted.
3
4 Some data were available only on annual basis. We used industrial production to transform GDP to
monthly basis, and public accounts, obtained from IFS and GFS publications, to transform public debt to
monthly basis.It is our expectation that country risk should increase with the ratio of public debt
to GDP; decrease with GDP growth and increase with interest rates since both variables
indicate the long term path conditions of public debt;  increase with inflation and
decrease with the ratio of international reserves to GDP. We also expect spreads to
increase with the ratio of exports to public debt and with the inverse of the amount of
time since the last default by PD/GDP and decline with duration. This variable is in itself
a measure of country risk: the riskier the country the shorter the duration of its bonds and,
if a country wants to issue a bond with a longer duration it will probably have to pay a
higher premium.
We estimated two alternative specifications. The first one
i i i i i i i i i i i i i PD X GDP PD DI MAT GDP PD EMBI / ) / * ( / ϕ γ δ β α + + + + = (1)
The equations were estimated for the entire sample of countries as well as for
each country separately, using GLS and IV methods (to control for the endogeneity of
duration and interest rates). For the panel of countries we estimated a pooling effect
model, along with fixed effect and random effect ones.
Table1
Effects of Debt Fundamentals on Country Risk
GLS IV Variable
Pooling FE RE Pooling FE RE
C 376.13 -18.60 -1007.28 376.91 34.29 -973.36
(38.73) (71.37) (236.67) (39.47) (77.49) (236.38)
PD/GDP 30.20 119.93 265.40 30.42 116.76 267.05
(2.85) (8.20) (18.81) (2.91) (8.45) (18.90)
MAT -25.37 -36.32 -71.16 -26.18 -43.21 -82.59
(2.85) (4.47) (29.88) (2.94) (5.53) (30.39)
(PD/GDP)*DI 240.60 157.61 127.89 240.39 157.68 126.41
(14.63) (13.13) (16.57) (14.60) (13.26) (16.71)
X/PD -1154.46 -65.71 3811.93 -1157.41 -45.28 4045.45
(117.16) (358.94) (538.06) (116.97) (361.09) (550.63)
R
2 0.38 0.63 0.64 0.38 0.63 0.64
Adj. R
2 0.37 0.63 0.63 0.37 0.62 0.63
Note: Standard Deviations in parentheses
As we can see in all models the estimated coefficients exhibited the expected sign,
except for the ratio of exports to public debt in the random effect model, but with low
significance. The second specification estimated was as follows:
Z PD X GDP PD DI MAT GDP PD EMBI i i i i i i i i i i i i i θ ϕ γ δ β α + + + + + = / ) / * ( / (2)
where  Z  is a vector of variables that captures the economy’s general
fundamentals, as explained earlier on.
In order to produce the estimates for the second specification we used an IV
method with fixed effects. The impact of the general fundamentals on country risk was
investigated by introducing the variables one by one. The results for debt fundamentals
are the same as in the first specification.At same time, while interest rate and economic
growth have a significant effect on country risk, the reserves to GDP ratio presents a
strong multicollinearity with the exports to GDP ratio causing an over-specification
problem. Inflation is not significant. Therefore, we can assume that a model which
incorporates interest rates and economic growth is the most parsimonious one, and this
was the one elected to be used in the decomposition for the pool of countries that will be
our bench mark.Table 2
The Effects of General Fundamentals on Country Risk
Models  Variable
123456
C 376.91 255.62 289.34 258.16 1457.80 1513.87
(39.47) (40.55) (55.22) (31.81) (232.09) (197.86)
PD/GDP 30.42 33.46 29.45 63.20 28.11 33.54
(2.91) (3.22) (3.06) (3.44) (3.18) (3.60)
MAT -26.18 -32.73 -26.26 -17.90 -33.61 -40.72
(2.94) (4.33) (2.95) (2.57) (2.87) (4.11)
(PD/GDP)*DI 240.39 235.09 237.50 228.12 238.40 233.43
(14.60) (13.47) (15.45) (13.87) (14.44) (13.38)
X/PD -1157.41 -507.22 -1117.88 -119.29 -1106.78 -316.66










2 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.62 0.39 0.38
Adj. R
2 0.37 0.40 0.37 0.62 0.39 0.38
Note: Standard Deviations in parentheses
The first specification and the most parsimonious version of the second
specification were estimated for each country separately. To verify the impact of the
difference in coefficients (or discrimination, if you prefer) we used the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition. The results can be seen in Table 3.
Table 3










( B - A ) ( C - A )
Argentina 3241 2317 2342 -924 -899
Venezuela 915 251 377 -664 -538
Ukraine 540 378 330 -162 -210
Peru 541 386 372 -155 -169
Mexico 355 200 234 -155 -121
Korea 184 31 35 -153 -149
Brazil 907 764 808 -143 -99
Colombia 582 442 447 -140 -135
Russia 1264 1250 1199 -14 -65
Bulgaria 503 622 614 119 110
South Africa 175 310 301 135 126
Poland 182 403 379 221 197
Ecuador 1694 1917 1868 223 174
Panama 418 751 681 333 263
Philippines 493 830 778 337 284
Turkey 622 972 1130 349 508
Morocco 431 792 764 361 333
Malaysia 111 512 524 401 412
Egypt 233 999 943 767 710
The second column of Table 3 shows the average actual Embi for each county.
The third and fourth columns are the predicted Embis using the coefficients from the
panel data estimations in the two specifications with the variables of each country,respectively; putting it another way, the Embi that would prevail if countries’
fundamentals were evaluated by the market. using the same parameters The two
specifications produce very similar results. The last two columns are the differences
between the predicted Embi and the actual values.
As we can observe in Table 3, in absolute terms, Argentina was the country that
was most discriminated against in the sample: the average Embi for Argentina was
around 900 base points higher than we would expect considering its fundamentals. At the
other extreme was Egypt which received what could be referred to as “VIP” treatment. If
the fundamentals alone were taken into account Egypt’s average Embi would be more












( B - A ) ( C - A )
Argentina 1 1 1 0 0
Ecuador 2 2 2 0 0
Russia 3 3 3 0 0
Venezuela 4 17 14 13 10
Brazil 5 8 6 3 1
Turkey 6 5 4 -1 -2
Colombia 7 12 12 5 5
P e r u 81 4 1 56 7
Ukraine 9 15 16 6 7
Bulgaria 10 10 10 0 0
Philippines 11 6 7 -5 -4
Morocco 12 7 8 -5 -4
Panama 13 9 9 -4 -4
Mexico 14 18 18 4 4
Egypt 15 4 5 -11 -10
Korea 16 19 19 3 3
Poland 17 13 13 -4 -4
South Africa 18 16 17 -2 -1
Malaysia 19 11 11 -8 -8
Table 4 shows the differences in the country-risk(s) as a consequence of
discrimination. The first column is the actual ranking risk. The second and the third
columns are the predicted rankings as indicated by the fundamentals. The last two
columns are the differences between the actual figures and the predicted ones. If this
value is positive, then there is sufficient discrimination against the country to change its
place in the ranking. The first three positions are not affected: although Argentina is the
most discriminated against in absolute terms, eliminating the discrimination doesn’t
change the fact that it was the highest risk country in the sample; the same holds true for
Ecuador and Russia. Venezuela is the country that exhibits the largest change in its
position. Based on its fundamentals Venezuela should be in one of the last positions
instead of which it is in fourth position, together with Argentina, Russia and Ecuador.
This result may be explained by a political risk that is not captured by the model. On the
other hand, Egypt is the most favored country using this criterion. Korea, which is in 16
th
position should be the least risky country.Table 5
Relative Discrimination




















Table 5 shows the relative discrimination for the two specifications. Some
changes can be noted with regard to the previous case of absolute discrimination. Now,
Korea is the country that is most discriminated against. Its Embi should be roughly 82%
lower than it actually is, while Egypt and Malaysia remain the most favored countries in
our sample.
4. Conclusions
An analysis of country risk for a pool of emerging markets shows that its determinants
reflect both: fundamentals as well as sentiment. If the only factors that were taken into
consideration were economic fundamentals and past behavior in relation to debt
repayment then a number of countries would exhibit a very different level of risk than
they actually do. The only country in the sample that receives a fair evaluation, on this
basis, is Russia. In absolute terms, Argentina remains the most discriminated against
country in the sample, but even after correcting for this it continues to be the riskiest
country. Venezuela is the negatively affected or impacted economy that suffers the
biggest drop in terms of position: after correcting for discrimination it would go from
being the 4
th riskiest country to the 17
th riskiest, in front of just Malaysia and Korea. In
relative terms is Korea the most discriminated against country: it should be the least risky
economy in the sample instead of being the 16
th riskiest.
5. References
Edwards, S. LDC Foreign Borrowing and Default Risk: An Empirical Investigation:
1976-1980”American Economic Review, 74. Sep 1984.
Eichengreen, B. Mody A. “What Explains Changing Spreads on Emerging-Market Debt:
Fundamentals or Market Sentiment? NBER Working Paper Series W6408, 1998.
Fiess, N. Capital Flows, Country Risk and Contagion Policy Research Working Paper
2943, The World Bank 2003.
Min, H.G. Determinants of Emerging Market Bond Spread: Do Economic Fundamentals
Matter?  Working Paper Series 1899. The World Bank.
Reinhart, C. Rogoff K,  and Savastano, M “Debt Intolerance” NBER Working Paper No
W9908  (2003).